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Abstract
This paper studies the issue of the eﬃcient taxation of capital in-
come in intertemporal optimizing models with infinite horizons and
endogenous population growth. We discover that, in the steady state,
the optimal capital income tax is negative when the economy is closed.
Instead, in a small open economy facing perfect capital mobility, the
Chamley-Judd result of a zero tax rate is obtained if capital taxation
is source-based; otherwise, income from wealth should be subsidized
if taxation is residence-based. Moreover, we find that in our setup,
taxing capital income with immediate expensing of capital expendi-
ture may replicate the first-best equilibrium when labor is subsidized.
Our findings, which depart substantially from those obtained in rep-
resentative agent models with an endogenous labor supply, are to be
ascribed to a wealth eﬀect in the fertility choices that directly aﬀects
the pseudo-welfare function of the social planner.
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1 Introduction
A recurrent question vivifies the doctrinary and policy debate regarding the
desiderable tax structure: given the highly distortionary nature of capital
taxes, should capital income be alleviated from the burden of taxation? See,
for example, Boskin (1996 and 2005), Altig et alii (2001), Slemrod and Bakija
(2004), and the 2005 Economic Report of the President’s Tax Chapter.
The idea of a zero capital income tax rate, largely in the background of
this debate, originates from Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986), who address
the question of factor income taxation by using an intertemporal second-best
perspective. Judd (1985) analyzes the redistributive potential of a capital in-
come tax in a neoclassical growth model with Kaldorian heterogeneity where
capital tax revenues are lump-sum transferred from capitalists to workers.
He discovers, surprisingly, that setting capital income taxes equal to zero in
the long-run is optimal also from the workers’ standpoint; this is because
a capital levy depresses workers’ disposable income, as the long-run supply
of capital is infinitely elastic. In a representative agent economy with labor
endogenously supplied, Chamley (1986) argues that the optimal dynamic tax
configuration is one in which capital income should be exempted from tax-
ation, while labor income should bear the tax burden required to finance a
given stream of government expenditure.1 The Chamley discovery is only
1As evidenced by Chari and Kehoe (1999), and Judd (1999), the intuitive foundation
for the optimal zero tax on capital income can be derived from two classic principles
of commodity tax theory: i) intermediate goods should be exempted from taxation as
taxes are to be levied only on final goods (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971); and ii) all
commodities should be taxed at a uniform rate (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1972). While a
labor income tax solely distorts the static consumption-leisure decisions, a tax on capital
income generates an intertemporal distortion between the marginal rate of substitution of
consumption at two diﬀerent dates and the corresponding marginal rate of transformation;
such a distortion increases exponentially in time. Therefore, taxing capital income entails
taxing consumption at diﬀerent dates diﬀerently, thus violating the normative principle
of uniform taxation of consumption goods. Moreover, productive eﬃciency requires that
the capital stock (an intermediate good since it does not enter the utility function) should
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valid asymptotically. If the instantaneous utility function of consumers is
strongly separable in consumption and leisure, and in addition is isoelastic
in consumption, welfare maximization implies that capital should be taxed
at 100 percent at the initial period and zero afterwards; this is because the
capital stock is inelastic in the short-run and therefore it must be eﬃciently
taxed at a confiscatory rate.
Lucas (1990), Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1993 and 1997), Correia (1996b),
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), and Judd (1999), among others, find that
the optimality of the zero capital income tax carries over a wide variety of se-
tups that incorporate human capital accumulation, perpetual growth, perfect
capital mobility and overlapping-generations.2
The second-best principle of capital taxation established by Judd (1985)
and Chamley (1986), however, is not an ineluctable law of dynamic pub-
lic finance as shown, for example, by Correia (1996a), Jones, Manuelli and
Rossi (1997), Chamley (2001), Erosa and Gervais (2002), and Abel (2006).3
Correia (1996a) discovers that the introduction of an additional factor of
production, which cannot be optimally taxed or subsidized, in a Ramsey-
Ricardo exogenous growth model leads to a violation of the zero capital tax
prescription. From a methodological perspective, Jones, Manuelli and Rossi
(1997) identify two types of changes in the neoclassical intertemporal frame-
work that lead to a capital income tax diﬀerent from zero. The first change
is obtained if the capital stock appears in the pseudo-welfare function of the
social planner; this case is satisfied, for example, when the labor supply is
inelastic (i.e. pure rents enter the consumer’s budget constraint) and there
be untaxed, while labor (a final good as it appears in the utility function of consumers
through leisure) should be taxed.
2In particular, Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999) provide a generality test of the
Chamley-Judd tax result by systematically relaxing one by one the hypotheses that sup-
port it and discovering that, in so doing, its validity remains unaﬀected.
3Other contributions in which optimal capital income taxation may diﬀer from zero are
by Pestieau (1974), Atkinson and Sandmo (1980), Lansing (1999), Boadway, Marchand
and Pestieau (2000), and Cremer, Pestieau, and Rochet (2003).
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is a bound on labor income taxation.4 The second change is represented by
the case in which the planner faces diﬀerent constraints from the consumer
involving the capital stock; an example of this circumstance occurs when the
planner cannot distinguish between the income from two types of labor and
there are restrictions on the tax codes (namely, the two types of labor should
be equally taxed).
Erosa and Gervais (2002) provide another example in which the Chamley-
Judd result is inapplicable. They use a standard life-cycle growth model, in
which, as individuals have a labor-leisure choice in each period of their lives,
and hence the individual’s optimal consumption-work plan is almost never
constant, it is optimal almost always to tax consumption goods and labor
earnings at diﬀerent rates over an individual’s lifetime. This goal can be
achieved by using capital and labor income taxes that vary with age. Judd
(2002), instead, obtains a negative capital income tax rate in a dynamic
model with monopolistic competition in the product market; in his view, a
capital subsidy can lighten the allocative ineﬃciency due to the monopoly
power of firms, thereby contrasting the reduction of capital and output im-
plied by the non-competitive equilibrium. By using an infinitely-lived model
of capital formation, Abel (2006) shows that if capital expenses could be
deducted immediately from taxable capital income, tax eﬃciency would pre-
scribe a positive tax on capital income and a zero tax on labor income. This
optimal tax structure, which is the opposite of the Chamley-Judd principle,
exactly replicates the first-best allocation obtainable with lump-sum taxa-
tion.
In this paper, we study the issue of the optimal capital income taxation in
neoclassical growth models with infinite horizons and elastic fertility choices,
i.e. endogenous population growth; the analysis considers closed and small
open economies. The hypothesis of endogenous fertility has been neglected
by the copious literature on eﬃcient capital income taxation based on in-
4The case developed by Correia (1996a) can be viewed as another example of such a
change.
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tertemporal optimizing models. One possible explanation for this lack of
analysis is the apparent similarity of infinitely-lived models based on endoge-
nous fertility with those incorporating elastic labor-leisure choices. From a
normative perspective on factor income taxation, this paper demonstrates
that a model with endogenous fertility is qualitatively non-equivalent to a
model with an elastic labor supply as their relative prescriptions on capital
income taxation diﬀer substantially.
We discover that, in a closed economy, the optimal tax configuration
prescribes, in the limit, the subsidization of capital income and the taxation
of labor income.5 This result is to be attributed to a wealth eﬀect in the
fertility choices; such an eﬀect stems from the fact that the opportunity
cost of fertility, which in equilibrium must be equal to the marginal rate of
substitution of consumption for fertility, is given by the wage cost of child
rearing plus the stock of wealth (namely, the capital stock).
If an open economy facing perfect capital mobility is taken into ac-
count, two possible regimes for taxing capital income should be considered:
the residence-based or worldwide regime and the source-based or territorial
regime. According to the residence-based principle, the tax is levied on cap-
ital income of domestic residents regardless of the country where income is
originated; residence-based taxes represent taxes that accrue on nonhuman
wealth. Source-based capital income taxes, instead, are imposed on all cap-
ital income obtained in a particular jurisdiction regardless of the residence
country of savers; in this case, the location of capital, i.e. investment, is
subject to taxation.
When a financially integrated small open economy is considered, an en-
dogenous population growth implies that the eﬃcient capital income taxa-
tion strictly depends on which regime is adopted. Diﬀerently from Correia
(1996b), Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), and Chari and Kehoe (1999),
5The result of a negative capital income tax rate is not new, having also been ob-
tained by Correia (1996a), when the additional untaxed factor of production is Edgeworth
substitutable with capital, and Judd (2002).
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where the Chamley-Judd principle is confirmed under both international
regimes of wealth income taxation, our key findings involve either subsidizing
capital, if taxation is residence-based, or avoiding the distortion of capital
formation, if taxation responds to a source-based criterion; a fiscal levy on
labor income, irrespective of the taxation regime, should be imposed.
Finally, we examine, in the context of endogenous fertility, the proposal
of capital income taxation combined with an immediate expensing of capital
expenditure as proposed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967), and studied in a
general equilibrium context by Abel (2006). In a closed economy, the first-
best equilibrium is replicated if the tax on capital is accompanied by a labor
subsidy. In the open economy analysis, the closed economy findings are
reiterated if gross saving is expensed from taxable wealth income when the
residence-based regime is adopted. Our results stand in sharp contrast with
those obtained by Abel (2006) in a closed economy, where eﬃciency requires
to tax capital and free labor from taxation.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the closed economy
model with endogenous fertility choices, and analyzes its positive and norma-
tive implications for factor income taxation. Section 3 extends the previous
analysis to a small open economy facing perfect capital mobility. Section 4
discusses the proposal of expensing capital expenditure from taxable income
in the case of endogenous population growth. Section 5 concludes.
2 Closed economy
2.1 The setup
Consider a real closed economy peopled by immortal consumers, who de-
cide on consumption, fertility, and saving on an intertemporal basis.6 The
representative consumer of this economy maximizes the following integral
6The model employed here builds on Razin and Ben-Zion (1973), Palivos (1995) and
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2003, ch. 9).
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utility
? ∞
0
U(c, n)e−ρtdt, (1)
where c is per capita consumption, n the fertility rate, and ρ the exogenous
rate of time preference.7 The instantaneous utility function U(c, n), which
is strictly increasing in c and n, satisfies the usual properties of regularity. c
and n are assumed to be normal goods.
Two constraints must be respected when (1) is maximized. One is the
intertemporal budget constraint, given by
? ∞
0
[c− (1− τ l)wl − q]e−
? t
0 [(1−τk)(r−δ)−n]dsdt = k0, (2)
where w represents the wage rate, l labor hours, q lump-sum transfers from
the government (in per capita terms), r the before-tax interest rate, δ the
constant capital depreciation rate, and k the per capita capital stock (k0 is k
at time 0). τk and τ l indicate ad valorem capital and labor income tax rates,
respectively; capital depreciation allowances are permitted.
Moreover, the time allocation constraint
l + T (n) = 1, (3)
must also be considered in addition to (2) when (1) is maximized. According
to (3), the fixed time endowment (normalized to one) can be used either for
working or for raising children. T ( · ) denotes the amount of time devoted
to child-rearing (with T  > 0 and T  ≶ 0).
The maximization of (1) subject to (2) and (3) yields the following first-
order conditions
7Note that n also represents the population growth rate as the mortality rate is zero
and the economy is closed.
7
Uce−ρt = λe−
? t
0 [(1−τk)(r−δ)−n]ds, (4a)
Une−ρt = λe−
? t
0 [(1−τk)(r−δ)−n]ds[(1− τ l)wT  + k0e
? t
0 [(1−τk)(r−δ)−n]ds], (4b)
where λ = Uc[c(0), n(0)] = Uc[0] is the Lagrange multiplier on the intertem-
poral budget constraint (2).
Equation (4b) can be rewritten as
Un
Uc
= (1− τ l)wT  + k, (4b’)
while from (4a), we obtain the following Euler equation
− d
dt
lnUc = (1− τk)(r − δ)− n− ρ. (4c)
Equation (4b’) asserts that the marginal rate of substitution of consump-
tion for fertility must equal the opportunity cost of one unit of fertility, given
by the after-tax wage times the marginal time-cost of child-rearing plus the
per capita capital stock. Equation (4c) ensures that in the intertemporal
equilibrium the rate of return on consumption, i.e. ρ − d
dt
lnUc, is equal to
the after-tax return on per capita capital, namely, (1− τk)(r − δ)− n.
Production is carried out by many competitive firms. The production
function, which is given by y = F (k, l), satisfies the usual neoclassical prop-
erties of regularity and is linearly homogeneous in k and l.
Maximum profits requires
Fk(k, l) = r, (5a)
8
Fl(k, l) = w. (5b)
The resource constraint is given by
F (k, l) = c+
.
k +(δ + n)k + g. (6)
Finally, the government balances its budget by financing public expendi-
tures through factor income taxation
τk(r − δ)k + τ lwl = g + q, (7)
where g denotes the exogenous per capita government consumption expen-
diture.
2.2 Positive analysis
In the steady state, the macroeconomic model can be succintly written as8
Un(c, n)
Uc(c, n)
= (1− τ l)Fl[k, 1− T (n)]T (n) + k, (8a)
(1− τk){Fk[k, 1− T (n)]− δ} = ρ+ n, (8b)
F [k, 1− T (n)] = c+ (δ + n)k + g. (8c)
We assume that lump-sum transfers q adjust endogenously to maintain the
government budget in equilibrium, while g is given.
8The dyamic properties of the model are studied in Palivos (1995). The model exhibits
saddle-point stability if the condition T 32Fll − FlT 33 < 0 is satisfied.
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The above equations may be written in implicit form as9
n = n(c, k; τ l), nc > 0; nk < 0; nτ l > 0; (8a’)
k = k(n; τk), kn < 0; kτk < 0; (8b’)
c = c(k, n), ck > 0; cn < 0. (8c’)
By reducing the after-tax wage and hence the opportunity cost of fertility,
an increase in τ l stimulates the fertility rate (for a given level of consump-
tion).10 Hence, more time for child rearing is required; a reduction in labor
hours worked takes place. The capital stock is driven down because there
is an inverse relationship between per capita capital and population growth;
this is a sort of reverse Malthus law implied by the ”modified golden rule”
(8b). Consumption is reduced by the lower capital stock and the higher
fertility rate.
A rise in τk pulls the capital stock down as, for a given fertility rate, the
after-tax marginal product of capital is lowered.11 The fall in k generates two
contrasting eﬀects on fertility; it stimulates the demand for fertility as the
9The expressions of the partial derivatives of relationships (8’) are
nc =
UnUcc − UcUcn
UcΛ
> 0; nk =
Uc[(1− τ l)T 3Flk + 1]
Λ < 0; nτ l = −
UcT
3Fl
Λ > 0;
kn =
[1 + (1− τk)T 3Fkl]
(1− τk)Fkk
< 0; kτk =
(Fk − δ)
(1− τk)Fkk
< 0;
ck = Fk − δ − n > 0; cn = −(FlT 3 + k) < 0;
where Λ = Unn −
Un
Uc
Ucn + (1− τ l)Uc(T 32Fll − FlT 33) < 0.
10The basic steady state eﬀects of labor taxation are given by:
dn
dτ l
=
nτ l
Ω > 0;
dk
dτ l
=
knnτ l
Ω < 0;
dc
dτ l
=
(ckkn + cn)nτ l
Ω < 0;
where Ω = 1− kn(nk + ncck)− cnnc > 0.
11A rise in τk has the following long-run eﬀects
dn
dτk
=
(ncck + nk)kτk
Ω ≶ 0;
dk
dτk
=
(1− cnnc)kτk
Ω < 0;
dc
dτk
=
(ck + nkcn)kτk
Ω < 0;
where Ω > 0 has been defined in footnote 10.
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opportunity cost of fertility falls, on the one side, and discourages fertility
because of the reduction in the after-tax marginal productivity of capital, on
the other. Therefore, fertility moves unclearly, while consumption is unam-
biguously reduced.
2.3 Normative analysis
The problem of eﬃcient taxation, known as the ”Ramsey problem”, is stud-
ied by using the so-called ’primal method’ in the version developed by Lucas
and Stokey (1983); such a method is based on the concept of implementabil-
ity constraint, which is obtained from the households’ intertemporal budget
constraint by expressing prices and taxes in terms of quantities through the
marginal conditions (4).12 Optimal taxation is analyzed under the assump-
tion that total government spending is fixed.
Plugging (3), (4a), (4b’) and λ = Uc[0] into (2), we get the implementabil-
ity constraint, given by
? ∞
0
[(c− q)Uc −
(1− T )
T 
(Un − kUc)]e−ρtdt = k0Uc[0]. (9)
The eﬃcient taxation of factor income is found by maximizing the utility
functional (1) subject to the implementability constraint (9) and the feasi-
bility constraint (6), once the time allocation constraint (3) is brought in.
Define the pseudo-welfare function as
W (c, n, k,Φ) = U(c, n) + Φ{(c− q)Uc(c, n)− [1− T (n)]
T (n)
[Un(c, n)− kUc(c, n)]},
where Φ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (9). Φ is positive in the
case of distortionary taxation of labor income.
The second-best problem can be formulated in a formal way as follows:
12See Lucas (1990), and Chari and Kehoe (1999) for an application of such a method-
ology to the problem of optimal capital taxation.
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max
? ∞
0
W (c, n, k,Φ)e−ρtdt (10a)
subject to
.
k= F [k, 1− T (n)]− c− (δ + n)k − g. (10b)
We show that:
Proposition 1 In a closed economy model of capital accumulation with en-
dogenous population growth and infinitely-lived consumers, tax eﬃciency re-
quires the subsidization of capital in the long-run; this implies that it is op-
timal to tax labor income in order to finance a given stream of government
spending and the capital subsidy.
Proof. The first-order conditions for the ”Ramsey optimum” (10) are
Wce−ρt = Γ, (11a)
Wne−ρt = Γ(FlT  + k), (11b)
.
Γ= −Wke−ρt − Γ(Fk − δ − n), (11c)
where Γ is the co-state variable on the feasibility constraint, Wc = Uc[1 +
Φ(1+ηc)],Wn = Un[1+Φ(1+ηn)], andWk = Φ
(1− T )
T 
Uc. ηc and ηn represent
general equilibrium elasticities for consumption and fertility, respectively.13
13These elasticities are defined as ηc = (c− q)
Ucc
Uc
− (1− T )
T 3
(Unc − kUcc)
Uc
;
ηn = (c− q)
Ucn
Un
+
(1− T )T 33
T 32
− k Uc
Un
[1 +
(1− T )T 33
T 32
]− (1− T )
T 3
(Unn − kUnc)
Un
.
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Equation (11c) can be rewritten with the aid of (11a) as
− d
dt
lnWc =
Wk
Wc
+ Fk − δ − n− ρ. (11c’)
In the steady state, (4c) and (5a) imply that (1 − τk)(Fk − δ) = ρ + n.
Combining this equation with the long-run version of (11c’), one gets the
optimal capital tax rate τ ∗k; that is,
τ ∗k = −
Wk
(Fk − δ)Wc
< 0.
Normatively speaking, physical capital should be subsidized in the long-run.
The eﬃcient labor income tax rate, obtained by the government budget con-
straint after using τ ∗k, should instead be positive. ?
Our long-run results are to be ascribed to the fact that per capita cap-
ital enters the demand for fertility. This wealth eﬀect is obtained because
the opportunity cost of fertility depends on nonhuman wealth as population
growth erodes its stock in per capita terms. Since the static eﬃciency con-
dition for fertility enters the implementability constraint (9) and hence the
pseudo-welfare function of the social planner, the capital stock appears di-
rectly in the maximand function of the ”Ramsey problem”, thus altering the
Chamley-Judd optimal capital tax rule.14
The ratio of this optimal tax configuration is imputable to the fact that
-when labor is taxed and hence fertility is stimulated and capital diminished-
capital subsidization becomes necessary in order to dampen population growth
and increase capital formation, thus allowing the economy to attain a higher
level of consumption and welfare of consumers.
14This is consistent with the methodological remarks on the zero capital tax rule put
forward by Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997, p. 105-06).
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3 Small open economy
3.1 The model
This section investigates the implications of endogenous fertility choices on
the eﬃcient capital income taxation in an international context. Let us ex-
tend the previous analysis to a small open economy that produces a single
tradable good, perfectly substitutable with the foreign produced good, and
that operates in a perfectly globalized capital market. Perfect capital mo-
bility implies that the relevant domestic interest rate is determined by the
exogenous world interest rate, denoted by r∗.15 Moreover, we assume that
no international migration of workers occurs.
Financial wealth per capita, a, consists of physical capital and net foreign
assets per capita, which are denoted by b; that is, a = k + b. While b may
be either positive or negative, a is considered to be strictly positive.
There are two systems of taxing income from capital in an open economy:
the residence-based (often called worldwide) system and the source-based
(also known as territorial) system.
Under the residence-based system of capital taxation, incomes from do-
mestic and foreign wealth are taxed uniformly. Therefore, perfect capital
mobility requires that the before-tax rates of return on each asset are equal-
ized; that is, r − δ = r∗. The households’ flow budget constraint is given
by
.
k +
.
b= [(1− τa)r∗ − n](k + b) + (1− τ l)wl + q − c, (12)
where τa represents a proportional tax rate on income from financial wealth
inspired by the residence-based principle of taxation.
The maximization of (1) subject to (3) and (12) yields
Un
Uc
= (1− τ l)wT  + k + b, (13a)
15It is assumed that saving is not taxed abroad.
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− d
dt
lnUc = (1− τa)r∗ − n− ρ. (13b)
From (13a), it is clear that in an open economy (relatively to a closed
one) the opportunity cost of one unit of fertility is raised by b. Since r is
pinned down by r∗+ δ, the input demand system (5) implies that the capital
intensity and the wage rate are fixed and tax invariant; that is,
k
l
= κ∗ and
w = w∗, where κ∗ = f −1(r∗ + δ) > 0, w∗ = f(κ∗)− κ∗f (κ∗) and f(k
l
) = F (
k
l
, 1) is the output-labor ratio.
Alternatively, in the case of source-based capital taxation, the arbitrage
condition between domestic and foreign assets requires that the after-tax
return on capital is equal to the world interest rate, i.e. (1− τk)(r− δ) = r∗,
where τk represents the domestic capital income tax rate. Therefore, the
representative agent’s dynamic budget constraint becomes
.
k +
.
b= (r
∗ − n)(k + b) + (1− τ l)wl + q − c. (14)
From the consumers’ standpoint, optimality requires that (13a) and the
following Euler equation
− d
dt
lnUc = r
∗ − n− ρ, (15)
are satisfied.
The demand for capital (5a) along with the condition of perfect capital
mobility implies that (1− τk)[Fk(k, l)− δ] = r∗. From this relationship, we
get that
k
l
= κ(τk) (with κ =
(f  − δ)
(1− τk)f 
< 0) and, using (5b), w = w(τk)
(with w = −κ(f
 − δ)
(1− τk)
< 0).
In each capital income tax regime, revenues from labor and wealth taxa-
tion finance the exogenous stream of government expenditure.
15
The excess of national income over the aggregate demand gives the rate
of accumulation of net foreign assets; in per capita terms, we have
.
b= y + (r
∗ − n)b− c−
.
k −(δ + n)k − g. (16)
3.2 Positive analysis
In this section, we study the comparative static eﬀects of factor tax shifts
under the two fiscal regimes.16
Residence-based regime
Equation (13b) implies that n = (1 − τa)r∗ − ρ in the steady state.
Therefore, the long-run model can be expressed as
Un[c, (1− τa)r∗ − ρ]
Uc[c, (1− τa)r∗ − ρ]
= (1− τ l)w∗T [(1− τa)r∗ − ρ] + k + b, (17a)
k = κ∗ {1− T [(1− τa)r∗ − ρ]} , (17b)
(ρ+ τar∗)(k + b) + w∗ {1− T [(1− τa)r∗ − ρ]} = c+ g. (17c)
A rise in τ l leaves the fertility rate and the capital stock unaﬀected. The
implied reduction in the after-tax wage stimulates the holdings of net foreign
assets. An induced rise in disposable income occurs, which in turn raises
consumption.
By lowering the after-tax return on wealth, a higher τa brings the fertility
rate down. As the capital intensity is unchanged, the capital stock is pulled
16Note that the hypothesis of endogenous fertility ensures that the dynamics of an
infinitely-lived small open economy facing perfect capital mobility are non-degenerate (as
occurs in the corresponding setup incorporating elastic labor-leisure choices with adjust-
ment costs associated with capital accumulation), as the economy is saddle-point stable.
16
up from (17b), since labor hours worked are increased. Consumption and
nonhuman wealth unambiguously rise.17 The stock of net foreign assets may
rise or fall. Domestic output and national income are increased.
Source-based regime
As in the long-run n = r∗ − ρ from (15), the steady state economy is
described by
Un(c, r
∗ − ρ)
Uc(c, r∗ − ρ)
= (1− τ l)w(τk)T (r∗ − ρ) + k + b, (18a)
k = κ(τk)[1− T (r∗ − ρ)], (18b)
[ρ+ τkr
∗
(1− τk)
]k + ρb+ w(τk)[1− T (r∗ − ρ)] = c+ g. (18c)
A change in τ l reproduces the same eﬀects obtained under the residence-
based taxation of wealth income. By raising the cost of capital, a hike in τk,
17The consequences on c and a can be derived as follows. Keeping τ l fixed, (17a) and
(17c) can be written as
c = z(a; τa), za > 0; zτa < 0; (17a’)
c = c(a, τa), ca > 0; cτa > 0; (17c’)
where
za =
U2c
(UcUcn − UnUcc)
> 0; zτa = −
[UnUcn − UcUnn + U2c (1− τ l)w∗T 33]
(UcUcn − UnUcc)
< 0;
ca = (ρ+ τar∗) > 0; cτa = (a+ w
∗T 3)r∗ > 0.
Totally diﬀerentiating (17a’) and (17c’), the following multipliers are obtained
dc
dτa
=
(zacτa − cazτa)
(za − ca)
> 0;
da
dτa
=
(cτa − zτa)
(za − ca)
> 0;
where the condition za > ca, assumed to be satisfied, ensures saddle-point stability.
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instead, lowers the capital intensity and the capital stock, since the fertility
rate remains constant. The wage rate falls. Consumption, nonhuman wealth
and gross national income are reduced as well.18 The stock of net foreign
assets is, on the contrary, increased.
3.3 Normative analysis
Residence-based regime
In the small open economy, the implementability constraint is given by19
? ∞
0
{(c− q)Uc − (1− T )
T 
[Un − (k + b)Uc]}e−ρtdt = a0Uc[0], (19)
18To work out the eﬀects on consumption and financial wealth, write (18a) and (18c)
as follows
c = x(a; τk), xa > 0; xτk > 0; (18a’)
c = m(a, τk), ma > 0; mτk < 0; (18c’)
where
xa =
U2c
(UcUcn − UnUcc)
> 0; xτk = −
U2c (1− τ l)T 3w3
(UcUcn − UnUcc)
> 0;
ma = ρ > 0; mτk =
τkr∗(f 3 − δ)
(1− τk)2f 33
< 0.
Therefore, the steady state multipliers of consumption and financial wealth -derived
from (18’)- are
dc
dτk
=
(xamτk −maxτk)
(xa −ma)
< 0;
da
dτk
=
(mτk − xτk)
(xa −ma)
< 0;
where saddle-point stability requires xa > ma.
19Equation (19) is obtained by integrating the consumers’ flow budget constraint
(12) forward, incorporating the condition preventing Ponzi games —that is, limt→∞ a
e−
? t
0
[(1−τa)r∗−n]ds=0— and using the relationship Uce−ρt = Uc[0]e−
? t
0
[(1−τa)r∗−n]ds. The
implementability constraint (19) remains unaltered under the source-based regime of cap-
ital taxation even if the relationship (14), the proper ”no Ponzi game” condition and the
relationship Uce−ρt = Uc[0]e−
? t
0
(r∗−n)ds are now employed.
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while the pseudo-welfare function of the social planner becomes
W (c, n, k + b,Ψ) = U(c, n) +Ψ{(c− q)Uc − (1− T )
T 
[Un − (k + b)Uc]},
where Ψ is the positive Lagrange multiplier on (19).
The optimal tax structure can be obtained by maximizing the present
discounted value of the pseudo-welfare function subject to the balance of
payments equation (16), once the production function and the time allocation
constraint (3) are taken into account.
We can state that:
Proposition 2 In an immortal small open economy that operates under per-
fect capital mobility and exhibits endogenous population growth, a residence-
based system of taxation implies that the optimal tax rate on wealth is nega-
tive in the steady state. Therefore, labor should bear the burden of taxation
necessary to finance all government outlays.
Proof. The optimal social planner problem entails20
Wn
Wc
= FlT
 + k + b, (20a)
− d
dt
lnWc =
Wa
Wc
+ Fk − ρ− δ − n, (20b)
Fk − δ = r∗. (20c)
20The partial derivatives of the pseudo-welfare function are
Wc = Uc[1 + Ψ(1 + εc)], and Wn = Un[1 +Ψ(1 + εn)]; εc and εn are general equilibrium
elasticities defined as
εc = (c− q)
Ucc
Uc
− (1− T )
T 3
[Unc − (b+ k)Ucc]
Uc
;
εn = (c− q)
Ucn
Un
+
(1− T )T 33
T 32
− (b+ k)Uc
Un
[1 +
(1− T )T 33
T 32
]− (1− T )
T 3
[Unn − (b+ k)Unc]
Un
.
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In the long-run, (20b) and (20c) imply r∗ = ρ+n−Wa
Wc
. As (1− τa)r∗ =
ρ+ n from (13b), we obtain that τ ∗a = −
Wa
r∗Wc
< 0; that is, the optimal tax
rate on wealth income under the residence-based system is negative in the
steady state. 
By confirming our closed economy findings, we depart from the Chamley-
Judd prescription established for a small open economy by Correia (1996b),
Atkeson, Chari and Kehoe (1999), and Chari and Kehoe (1999). The ratio-
nale for the optimal tax structure just obtained is basically the same as the
one highlighted above for the closed economy.
Source-based regime
Under this international tax regime, the social planner optimum implies
that relationships (20) must still be satisfied. As the relationships Fk−δ = r∗,
from (20c), and (1− τk)(Fk − δ) = r∗, from the condition of perfect capital
mobility, must be simultaneously satisfied, it is then requiered that τ ∗k = 0.
This result can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 3 In a model with endogenous fertility and perfect capital mo-
bility, the optimal source-based taxation of capital income should be asymp-
totically zero.
Such a discovery departs from our previous results, but confirms what is
found in a small open economy when labor-leisure choices are elastic. The
mechanical motivation for this normative result stems from the fact that the
before-tax return on the domestic asset must equal the (untaxed) return on
net foreign assets. The intuitive motivation is, instead, as follows. As the
capital income tax rate does not aﬀect fertility, labor taxation works in a
lump-sum fashion. It is then optimal to simply eliminate the tax distortion
aﬀecting capital formation to replicate the first-best allocation.
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4 Fertility choices and capital taxation with
capital expenditure expensing
Abel (2006) investigates the general equilibrium eﬀects of capital income tax-
ation when gross investment is immediately expensed from the tax base as
proposed by Hall and Jorgenson (1967). He discovers that, in an infinitely-
lived closed economy with an endogenous labor supply the first-best alloca-
tion is replicated if the positive capital income tax is accompanied by a zero
tax rate on labor income. The non-distortionary nature of this tax struc-
ture, which is also valid for the short-run, is due to the exemption of saving
from the burden of taxation or, in the Abel (2006) interpretation, to a zero
eﬀective capital tax rate.
Here, we study how the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) and Abel (2006) tax
proposal works in general equilibrium models with elastic fertility and what
its normative implications for factor income taxation are. We discover that
endogenous fertility choices imply that the policy prescriptions for eliminat-
ing the allocative distortions of the capital levy may involve diﬀerent tax
rules from those obtained in models with an endogenous labor supply.
4.1 Closed economy
When gross investment can be deducted from taxable capital income, the tax
base in levels is given by rK−
.
K −δK (where K is the level of the capital
stock). Therefore, the dynamic budget constraint of consumers, expressed in
per capita terms, is given by
.
k= (r − δ − n)k +
[(1− τ l)wl + q − c]
(1− τk)
. (21)
The first-order conditions for the maximization of (1) subject to (3) and
(21) are
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Un
Uc
= (1− τ l)wT  + (1− τk)k, (22a)
− d
dt
lnUc = r − δ − n− ρ. (22b)
In this case, factor income taxation involves only static distortions as
the intertemporal tax wedge on capital income disappears. By embedding
equations (22) into the general equilibrium model, it can immediately be seen
that the first-best allocation is replicated if τk > 0 and τ l = −
k
wT 
τk < 0.21
This result, which is the exact opposite of our closed economy one, also diﬀers
from the Abel (2006) finding, which instead implies that labor income should
be tax free.
This discovery can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 4 In a model with endogenous fertility, capital income taxation
combined with the exemption of capital expenditure requires that labor should
be subsidized with the scope of replicating the first-best allocation.
4.2 Small open economy
As the Abel (2006) tax proposal contemplates de facto a full expensing of
saving, i.e. gross capital accumulation, in an open economy we have to
21Abel (2006) shows that the Hall-Jorgenson proposal of capital income tax generates
the first-best equilibrium as a proposal based on consumption and labor tax mix, if the
normative prescription τ l = −τ c < 0 is satisfied (where τ c is a proportional consumption
tax rate); that is, consumption and leisure must be taxed at a uniform rate. It is not
diﬃcult to show that in our setup the co-existence of consumption and labor taxation
implies that for a positive consumption tax, the optimal labor subsidy rate that replicates
first-best allocation is given by τ l = −
(FlT
3 + k)
FlT 3
τ c < 0. Note that this result violates
the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1972) principle that all commodities (and hence fertility) should be
uniformly taxed (this is because the capital stock enters the implicit cost of fertility).
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consider the full expensing of wealth accumulation in order to eliminate the
intertemporal wealth tax wedge. In an open economy, the distortionary role
of capital taxation can be eliminated if the fiscal regime adopted is residence-
based. In this case, taxable income from wealth is given by r(K + B)−
.
K
−δK−
.
B. The flow budget constraint of consumers can be written as
.
k +
.
b= (r
∗ − n)(k + b) + [(1− τ l)wl + q − c]
(1− τa)
. (23)
The basic equations describing the agent’s optimal choices are
Un
Uc
= (1− τ l)wT  + (1− τa)(k + b), (24a)
− d
dt
lnUc = r
∗ − n− ρ. (24b)
From equations (24), it is immediately clear that also in a small open
economy this type of nonhuman wealth taxation is non-distortionary if labor
is subsidized at a rate τ l = −
(k + b)
wT 
τa < 0.
In the case of a source-based capital tax regime, the Abel-Hall-Jorgenson
first-best proposal does not hold as the tax base is now given by income from
capital expensed from gross saving.
The following proposition summarizes our results
Proposition 5 In a small open economy with endogenous fertility and per-
fect capital mobility, optimal residence-based capital income taxation with
immediate expensing of wealth accumulation implies that the labor tax rate
should be negative to get nondistortionary capital taxation. A territorial capi-
tal income tax with saving expensing is not capable of reproducing the first-best
equilibrium.
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5 Concluding remarks
This paper has investigated the question of optimal factor income taxation
in intertemporal optimizing models of wealth formation with endogenous
population growth. The analysis has considered infinitely-lived closed and
small open economies.
The consideration of elastic fertility choices may invalidate the Chamley-
Judd normative prescription of a zero capital income tax rate found in a
neoclassical growth model with endogenous labor-leisure choices. In fact, in a
closed economy as well as in a small open economy operating under a perfectly
integrated capital market and adopting a regime of residence-based wealth
taxation, welfare maximization implies that income from capital should be
subsidized. If instead a small open economy that adopts a source-based
regime of taxation is taken into account, capital income should be exempted
from taxation.
Also the Abel (2006) proposal of accompanying capital taxation with the
exemption of gross investment from taxable income has been investigated
under the hypothesis of endogenous population growth. Our results depart,
once again, from those obtained in models with an elastic labor supply. We
discover that the first-best allocation can be replicated by adopting wealth
income taxation (that incorporates saving exemption) coupled with labor
income subsidization. This is valid for a closed economy and a small open
economy adopting a system of worldwide taxation.
Our general findings are quite surprising as infinitely-lived models with
endogenous fertility are similar to the corresponding models incorporating en-
dogenous labor-leisure choices. In particular, the similarity between the two
setups is due to the apparently parallel role of fertility and leisure: Fertility
is at the same time a good as well as indirectly an input, like leisure. Diﬀer-
ently from leisure, fertility enters the consumers’ budget constraint not only
through the time allocation constraint, but also through a nonlinear term
(given by the population growth rate times the capital intensity) that re-
flects the reduction in the capital-labor ratio due to population growth. This
24
element generates a demand for fertility that depends on financial wealth.
Since the static eﬃciency condition for fertility enters the implementability
constraint and hence the pseudo-welfare function of the social planner, the
stock of wealth appears directly in the maximand function of the ”Ramsey
problem”, thus altering the Chamley-Judd optimal capital income tax rule
(except for the case of a small open economy adopting a territorial system
of taxation).
Therefore, this theoretical contribution has identified another source of
invalidity of the Chamley-Judd zero capital tax principle. This source of
invalidity does not come from the supply-side – as, for example, occurs in
the cases analyzed by Correia (1996a), and Jones, Manuelli and Rossi (1997)
– but from the demand-side through the eﬀects of fertility on preferences
and the budget constraint of consumers.22
22Relatively to a small open economy, it can be curiously noticed that the consideration
of endogenous fertility choices entails a capital tax rate diﬀerent from zero in the sole case
of a residence-based regime, while the introduction of an additional untaxed input in a
model with an endogenous labor supply alters the result à la Chamley-Judd only when
capital taxation follows a source-based principle (Correia, 1996b).
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